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Abstract
Purpose – The aim of this paper is to examine the relative influence of regulatory enhancements relating to
corporate governance and attributes of business traits on performance of Malaysian listed companies.
Design/methodology/approach – Regression analysis was performed on all 742 non-financial main board
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia using data from 2013 annual reports.
Findings – The results show that the number of board meetings held during the year, role separation and
board size have a significant impact on corporate performance. By contrast, independent directors, government
ownership and director ownership do not influence corporate performance.
Research limitations/implications –The study investigated non-financial companies for the financial year
2013. Hence, the results may not apply to financial companies and other years. Future research can perhaps
include all types of listed companies and carry out a longitudinal study to gainmore comprehensive results and
understanding on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance. Additionally,
future research could also consider employing a different methodology to further unveil factors influencing
corporate performance.
Practical implications – The above findings provide new evidence of the effectiveness of the Malaysian
Code on Corporate Governance in improving company performance. The significance of board meetings, role
separation and board size shows the importance of internal governance in shaping company processes and
hence performance.
Originality/value – The result suggests that although theMalaysian Code on Corporate Governance follows
the corporate governance code of developed countries, the applicability of the recommendations to a developing
country is evidenced. Companies in Malaysia are predominantly government-owned or closely held, but it
appears that role separation matters even in these types of companies in achieving better performance.
Keywords Corporate governance, Corporate performance, Board size, Board meetings, Role duality,
Government ownership, Director ownership
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The governance landscape in theMalaysian business environment has gone through a series
of improvements since the introduction of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance
(MCCG) in 2000. TheMCCG, which was the result of consultations between various parties in
response to the need to restore investors’ confidence in the Malaysian market due to the
economic collapse brought about by the 1997/98 financial crisis, was revised in 2007 and 2012
to further clarify the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors. Central to the MCCG





© Nazli AnumMohd Ghazali. Published inAsian Journal of Accounting Research. Published by Emerald
Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence.
Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both
commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and
authors. The full terms of this licencemaybe seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode.
The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Ministry of Higher Education,
Malaysia (FRGS13-057-0298) in carrying out this research project. The author is also appreciative of the
constructive comments and suggestions given by the editor and anonymous reviewers on the paper.
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/2443-4175.htm
Received 21 March 2020
Revised 12 May 2020
11 June 2020
21 July 2020
Accepted 28 July 2020
Asian Journal of Accounting
Research





The original MCCG introduced in 2000 and following much of the UK Corporate
Governance Code sets out principles and guidelines to assist companies in designing the
corporate governance approach. Among the recommendations of theMCCG (2000) were clear
separation of roles between the chairman and the chief executive officer (CEO) and
independent directors making up at least one-third of the board membership. The revised
MCCG (2007) provides the eligibility criteria for the appointment of directors, audit
committees, frequency of meetings and the need for continuous training. The MCCG (2007)
also requires all public listed companies to have an internal audit function with the head
reporting directly to the audit committee. TheMCCG (2012) includes in its principles the need
for having formalized ethical standards through code of conduct and company strategies to
promote sustainability. The tenure of an independent director is also specified in addition to
requirement of annual assessment of the independent directors. The continuous
improvements to the MCCG show the seriousness of the Malaysian government in guiding
companies towards effective governance structure and efficient monitoring by corporate
boards. However, whether these revisions and improvements had led to better corporate
performance remains inconclusive as prior studies reported mixed results.
Additionally, as is the case with many emerging economies, the Malaysian business
environment is dominated by family-controlled and government-owned companies.
Claessens et al. (2000) found extensive family control in more than one-half of the East
Asian corporations, while state control is significant in Indonesia, Korea,Malaysia, Singapore
and Thailand. These types of ownership structure are in contrast to the widely held
companies that commonly exist in most developed countries (La Porta et al., 1999). Prior
studies have also reported that family firms are generally secretive in nature as evidenced by
a lower extent of disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ho andWong, 2001; Mohd Ghazali and
Weetman, 2006) as they may not be relying to any considerable extent on external financing.
The difference in types of ownership structure raises the question of the applicability of
governance guidelines designed for developed countries to emerging economies.
A study by Mardnly et al. (2018) on Syrian listed companies reported significant
association between foreign ownership and firmperformance, while concentratedmanagerial
ownership and corporate governance had no impact on firm performance. The authors
attributed the non-significance findings on corporate governance to lax oversight by the
regulatory authority and political situation in Syria due to the war. Meanwhile Kao et al.
(2019) who studied the effects of corporate governance reform in newly industrialised country
Taiwan found corporate governance mechanisms have a significant influence on firm
performance. These findings imply that a country’s political environment or stability and
economic development may have some influence on the effectiveness of regulatory actions
and business traits.
In the Malaysian context, previous studies by Ahmed Haji (2014) and Ahmed Haji and
Mubaraq (2015) examined the influence of corporate governance pre- and post-MCCG (2007).
These studies reported the significance of board size and board meetings in influencing
corporate performance post MCCG (2007). The authors partly attributed the findings to the
possible impact of the global financial crisis in 2007/2008 as it was also observed that
corporate performance worsened from 2006 to 2009 (Ahmed Haji, 2014). The present study
extends prior research by investigating all non-financial companies in a crisis-free
environment and following the third version of the MCCG, i.e. MCCG (2012) to provide a
more comprehensive analysis of the impact of both corporate governance and ownership
structure on firm performance.
The aim of this paper is to examine the relative influence of regulatory enhancements
relating to corporate governance and attributes of business traits on performance of
Malaysian listed companies. The paper is based on the expectation that given the continuous




and 2012, companies would be more sensitized to apply the essence or spirit of the guidelines
rather than adopting a box-ticking approach. This in turn should lead to a better corporate
performance. On the other hand, traditional business culture is endemic and may be difficult
to change. In this context, the unique ownership structure observed in developing countries
including Malaysia may have a lasting effect on corporate performance as the economy in
these countries has been described as relationship-based or crony capitalism (Fraser et al.,
2006; Gomez and Jomo, 2002; Johnson and Mitton, 2003). The contribution of this paper is by
way of determining whether the initiatives taken by the Malaysian government, i.e.
regulatory factors on corporate governance, can outweigh the long traditional influence of
business traits, i.e. ownership structure, on corporate performance.
The research questions (RQ) of this study are as follows:
RQ1. Do companies which adopt the recommendations of the MCCG perform better than
others?
RQ2. Does ownership structure have an impact on corporate performance?
The results show that the number of boardmeetings held during the year, role separation and
board size have a significant impact on corporate performance, while company size as a
control variable is marginally significant. In contrast, independent directors, government
ownership and director ownership do not influence corporate performance. These findings
suggest that companies with fewer board meetings during the year, different individuals
holding the chairmanship and CEO post and larger board size are associated with higher
corporate performance. It appears that regulatory efforts to enhance corporate governance
are proving fruitful in terms of promoting greater corporate accountability and hence better
performance. The results also imply that over time the influence of traditional traits may
diminish as is evident in the non-significance of government ownership and director
ownership in the present study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the hypotheses
based on the literature review and theoretical expectations. Section 3 details the research
method explaining the sample selection process and regressionmodel. This is followed by the
findings and analysis in Section 4. Conclusion, limitations and suggestions for future research
are provided in the last section.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
The focus of this study is the impact of corporate governance and ownership structure on
corporate performance. The ensuing sub-sections discuss and develop hypotheses relating to
these variables.
2.1 Corporate governance
Corporate governance is represented by board size, independent non-executive directors, role
duality and boardmeetings. The selection of variables in this category ismade with reference
to MCCG (2012).
2.1.1 Board size.Resource dependence theory suggests that the different skills, knowledge
and expertise brought into board discussions will help enhance corporate performance. This
implies that boards which constitute more members will be associated with better corporate
performance. Empirical studies which found support for a significant positive relationship
between board size and corporate performance include Al Farooque et al. (2020), Al-Matari
(2020), Bhatt and Bhattacharya (2015), Jackling and Johl (2009), Mishra and Kapil (2018) and
Ofoeda (2017).
By contrast, Jensen (1993) contends that a larger board size is more prone to disagreement





members on the board with opposing views may be associated with inferior corporate
performance. A number of prior studies provide support for this contention that board size
has a negative relationship with corporate performance. Included in these studies are Afrifa
and Tauringana (2015), Kao et al. (2019) andMak andKusnadi (2005), while Darko et al. (2016)
and Shao (2019) did not observe a significant relationship.
Principle 2 on strengthening composition in MCCG (2012) does not specify the number of
board members a company should appoint. Earlier studies on board size and corporate
performance in Malaysia did not document a significant relationship between the two
variables (Ahmed Haji, 2014; Mohd Ghazali, 2010, 2014). However, these studies investigated
a sample before 2012 and did not include all listed companies in their analyses. A study by
Hussain and Hadi (2019) reported board size to be significant and negatively associated with
financial performance of small and medium companies in the Malaysian construction
industry. However, no significant relationship was found in listed companies. As prior
studies documented mixed results on the relationship between board size and corporate
performance, a non-directional hypothesis is proposed:
H1. There is a significant relationship between board size and corporate performance.
2.1.2 Independent directors. The potential for agency conflicts is higher in widely held
companies due to divergence of interests among contracting parties (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Agency conflicts in corporations in developing countries are expected between owner–
managers and outside shareholders. To reduce these conflicts, independent directors can be
appointed to look after the interests of outside shareholders and limit managerial
opportunism (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
The MCCG recommends that independent directors make up one-third of the board, and
the Bursa Malaysia requires all listed companies to comply with this provision. Empirical
findings on the relationship between independent directors and corporate performance are
inconclusive. A number of studies found no significant relationship between independent
directors and corporate performance (Afrifa and Tauringana, 2015; Bhatt and Bhattacharya,
2015; Chen et al., 2005; Shao, 2019). This may not come as a surprise as there have been
questions on the “independency” of these independent directors (Meng, 2009; Mohd Ghazali
and Weetman, 2006).
Nonetheless, there are studies documenting the significance of independent directors in
enhancing corporate performance (Al Farooque et al., 2020; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Kao et al.,
2019). Darko et al. (2016) and Nguyen et al. (2017) on the other hand, observed a significant
negative association between independent directors and corporate performance.
In the Malaysian context, three prior studies using data pre- MCCG (2012) did not find a
significant relationship between independent directors and corporate performance (Ahmed
Haji, 2014; Leng, 2004; MohdGhazali, 2010). However, these studies were examining data pre-
2012 and did not include all listed companies in the analysis. As the most recent MCCG was
revised in 2012 and independent directors are one of the recommendations of the MCCG, it is
expected that since the MCCG was introduced more than ten years ago and revised twice,
companies are more aware of the essence of the code. In turn, independent directors should
also be efficient in discharging their duties, thereby contributing to better corporate
performance. The following hypothesis is proposed:
H2. There is a significant positive relationship between the proportion of independent
directors and corporate performance.
2.1.3 Role duality. The argument for separating the roles of chairman and CEO (i.e. different
individuals holding these positions) is based on the need to balance power and authority. If
these two positions are held by the same individual, a concentration of powermay exist in the




should oversee the performance of the directors, while the CEO is involved in the daily
operations of the business. Clear divisions of responsibilities between the chairman and the
CEO promote transparency and accountability, thereby steering companies towards
enhanced performance.
Empirical evidence appears to suggest that combining the roles results in worse
performance (Al Farooque et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Kao et al.,
2019; Shao, 2019). Mishra and Kapil (2018) found that separating the roles resulted in better
corporate performance in Sri Lanka. By contrast, Jackling and Johl (2009), Ofoeda (2017) and
Puni and Anlesinya (2020) observed no significant relationship between combined role and
corporate performance. In Malaysia, Rahman and Haniffa (2005) reported a negative
relationship, while Leng and Abu Mansor (2005) found a positive relationship between role
duality and corporate performance. As theMCCG specifically lists role separation as one of its
recommendations, companies which follow this recommendation are expected to perform
better than others. The following hypothesis is proposed:
H3. There is a significant positive relationship between role separation and corporate
performance.
2.1.4 Board meetings. According to Vafeas (1999), companies should balance the cost and
benefits associated with board meetings to ensure a positive impact on corporate
performance. Vafeas (1999) further suggests that if board activity is a proxy for active
monitoring by the board of directors, as insiders’ ownership increases less supervision by the
board is required. A board that meets frequently can be an indication of problems in the
company that require immediate or continuousmonitoring and decisions. Empirical evidence
supporting this view includes Lopez-Quesada et al. (2018) and Ofoeda (2017), where a
negative association was observed between number of board meetings and corporate
performance.
Khanchei (2007), on the other hand, opines that a board that meets frequently implies a
well-functioning and active board. Board meetings have been found to have a significant
positive impact on firm performance (Al Farooque et al., 2020; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010;
Mishra and Kapil, 2018; Puni and Anlesinya, 2020). This finding suggests that more frequent
board monitoring allows strategic decisions to be made at more regular intervals. Elsewhere,
no significant relationship was found between number of board meetings and corporate
performance (Bhatt and Bhattacharya, 2015; Jackling and Johl, 2009).
In Malaysia, Ahmed Haji (2014) and Ahmed Haji and Mubaraq (2015) reported significant
negative association between board meeting and market performance for the post MCCG
(2007) data. The pre-MCCG (2007) data however did not show significant association between
board meetings and firm performance. As prior studies documented mixed results on the
relationship between board meetings and corporate performance, a non-directional
hypothesis is proposed:
H4. There is a significant relationship between board meetings and corporate
performance.
2.2 Ownership structure
Ownership structure is represented by government ownership and director ownership, the two
significant features of business environment in Malaysia. Government-controlled companies
may be expected to perform better than others due to public pressure and high public
accountability in these companies. Director ownership is akin to owner-managed companies
and has incentives to perform well to avoid hostile takeover and outside participation.
2.2.1 Government ownership. A government-controlled company may have additional





because the level of public accountability in this type of company is high, government-
controlled companies would work harder to meet the nation’s expectations. Fauzi and
Musallam (2015) found support for a significant positive association between government
ownership and corporate performance. Ang and Ding (2006) also reported that government-
linked companies in Singapore had higher market valuation than other companies.
By contrast, Alipour (2013) documented a negative association between government
ownership and corporate performance, attributing the finding to the government’s preference
toward social and political goals as opposed to shareholders’wealth. Shen and Lin (2009) and
Zeitun and Tian (2007) also observed a significant negative relationship between state
ownership and corporate performance. Elsewhere, state ownership was not found to be
influencing corporate performance (Darko et al., 2016).
Prior studies on Malaysia found a significant positive relationship between government
ownership and corporate performance (Mohd Ghazali, 2010, 2014), implying constant
monitoring by the government in this type of companies aided in discharging public
accountability and hence legitimized their existence. This type of ownership structure is
expected to continue to prevail in Malaysia. However, its impact on corporate performance
remains to be seen given the heightened focus on corporate governance. The following
hypothesis is proposed:
H5. There is a significant positive relationship between government ownership and
corporate performance.
2.2.2 Director ownership. Ownership of shares by directors may help reduce agency conflicts
because owner–managers will have more incentives to maximise job performance (Jensen
andMeckling, 1976). A director who owns a large number of shares will be motivated to exert
greater efforts to maximize performance as he would reap the outcome of his actions. On the
other hand, entrenchedmanagement may engage in expropriation (Morck et al., 1988) leading
to worse corporate performance. Fauzi and Musallam (2015) found evidence that board
ownership destroys company performance. A study by Shao (2019) also showed significant
negative relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in Chinese
listed firms.
Empirical evidence supporting agency prediction includes Agrawal and Knoeber (1996),
Al Farooque et al. (2020) and Daily and Dalton (2004). These studies reported a significant
positive association between director ownership and corporate performance. Additionally,
Lappalainen and Niskanen (2012) documented that companies with high managerial
ownership exhibited higher profitability. Alabdullah (2018) also observed a significant
positive relationship between managerial ownership and financial performance in Jordanian
listed firms.
Other studies including Ahmed Haji (2014), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Mak and Kusnadi
(2005) and Mohd Ghazali (2014) observed no significant relationship between director
ownership and corporate performance. The revised MCCG (2012) emphasizes further the role
of the board in directing their efforts and resources towards the best interest of the company.
This responsibility coupled with share ownership should provide the impetus for directors to
strive harder for sustainable and enhanced corporate performance. The following hypothesis
is proposed:
H6. There is a significant positive relationship between director ownership and
corporate performance.
2.3 Control variable
Following the practice of prior studies, company size is included as a control variable. It is




economies of scale and ability to obtain cheaper financing. Although previous studies had
documented the non-significance of company size (Alabdullah, 2018; Al-Matari, 2020), a
number of prior studies showed evidence of company size influencing corporate performance
with larger companies being more profitable (Ahmed Haji, 2014; Ahmed Haji and Mubaraq,
2015; Al Farooque et al., 2020; Mardnly et al., 2018; Ofoeda, 2017).
3. Research method
3.1 Sample selection
Pursuant to the introduction of theMCCG in 2000 and subsequent revision in 2007, theMCCG
(2012) was issued by the Securities Commission Malaysia in March 2012 and effective
immediately. Considering that companies may take some time to familiarize with this new
version of the MCCG (2012), all non-financial listed companies with financial year end 31
December 2013 were selected for analysis in the present study. As at 31 December 2013, the
total number of companies on the main market of Bursa Malaysia was 814 [1]. Table 1 below
summarizes the selection process which results in 742 sample companies. The annual reports
of these companies were then downloaded from the Bursa Malaysia website.
To determine the relationship between corporate governance attributes and traditional
traits of ownership structure, a multiple regression analysis was performed.
The regression model is as follows:
ROE ¼ β0 þ β1BODSZþ β2INDþ β3DUALþ β4BMEETþ β5GOVOWNþ β6DIROWN
þ β7COSZþ ε
Table 2 shows operationalisation of the variables included in the analysis.
Statistical analysis on data in this study was run using the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 20.
4. Findings and analysis
The association between the independent variables was assessed using correlation analysis.
The correlation analysis in Table 3 shows that the independent variables are not highly
correlated with one another. Collinearity cut-off has been suggested as 0.7 (Tabachnick and
Fidell, 2001, p. 84); others such as Gujarati (2003) have suggested a higher cut-off value of 0.8.
The present study takes 0.7 as the cut-off value for collinearity, to minimise misinterpretation
of the statistical results.
The highest correlation is0.460 which is between board size and independent directors.
The negative association implies that companies with larger boards have a smaller
proportion of independent directors. Government ownership has positive association with
company size (r 5 0.377), suggesting that government-controlled companies are generally
large in size. Board meetings also have a positive association with company size (r5 0.286)
Bursa Malaysia as at 31 December 2013
Companies listed on main market 814
Finance (34)
Real estate investment trust (16)








and government ownership (r 5 0.274), implying that larger companies and government-
controlled companies held more board meetings during the year.
Government ownership has a negative association with director ownership, which
indicates that directors’ shareholding is less in government-controlled companies. This is
expected as government-controlled companies usually appoint retired civil servants to the
board with minimal share ownership. Additionally, director ownership implies owner-
managed companies which are generally smaller in size and have less government
participation. The small-size argument is further evidenced in the negative association
between director ownership and company size (r 5 0.226).
Board size has a positive association with government ownership (r 5 0.223) and
company size (r5 0.224), suggesting that government-controlled and larger companies have
more members on the board. The larger the board size the more meetings held during the
year, as indicated by the positive association between the two variables (r 5 0.206).
Interestingly, director ownership has a negative association with board meetings
(r 5 0.212), implying a substitutive relationship between the two variables. It appears
that board monitoring in the form of frequency of meetings can be reduced if the company
is owner-managed. This finding provides support to Vafeas’ (1999) suggestion that if
board activity is a proxy for active monitoring, less supervision may be required as
insiders’ ownership increases.
The regression model with seven independent variables and ROE as its dependent
variable as shown in Table 4 resulted in three corporate governance attributes and one
BODSZ IND DUAL BMEET GOVOWN DIROWN COSZ
BODSZ 1
IND 0.460** 1
DUAL 0.151** 0.042 1
BMEET 0.206** 0.006 0.045 1
GOVOWN 0.223** 0.074* 0.072 0.274** 1
DIROWN 0.115** 0.097* 0.109** 0.212** 0.256** 1
COSZ 0.224** 0.012 0.064 0.286** 0.377** 0.226** 1
Note(s): **correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Variable Definition Measurement
Dependent variables
ROE Corporate performance Profit after tax/Shareholders’ funds
β0 . . . β7 Regression coefficients
Independent variables
BODSZ Board size Number of board of directors
IND Percentage of independent
directors
Number of independent directors/Total number of
directors
DUAL Role duality 1 5 chairman is also the CEO/MD
2 5 chairman is neither the CEO nor MD
BMEET Board meetings Number of board meetings held during the year
GOVOWN Government ownership Percentage of shares held by the government
DIROWN Director ownership Percentage of shares held by the directors










control variable being statistically significant. Boardmeeting is statistically significant at the
1% level, while duality and board size are statistically significant at the 5% level. The results
suggest that companies with fewer number of board meetings, different individuals holding
the CEO and chairman posts and a higher number of boardmembers aremore profitable than
others. In contrast, independent directors, government ownership and director ownership do
not influence corporate performance.
Although much of prior studies showed frequent board meetings led to improved
company performance (Al Farooque et al., 2020; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Mishra and
Kapil, 2018; Puni and Anlesinya, 2020), the finding in the present study suggests otherwise.
Board meetings are negatively associated, implying that frequent board meetings are
detrimental to corporate performance. This result, which is consistent with studies by
Lopez-Quesada et al. (2018) and Ofoeda (2017) indicates that board meetings are costly in
financial terms and in signalling that all is not well in the company, necessitating the
frequent meetings. The findings in the present study also provide support to earlier studies
(Ahmed Haji, 2014; Ahmed Haji and Mubaraq, 2015) which documented significant
negative relationship between board meetings and firm performance post implementation
in Malaysia.
The result on role separation supports prior studies (Al Farooque et al., 2020; Chen et al.,
2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Kao et al., 2019; Shao, 2019). The evidence shows that
separating the chairman and CEO positions results in better corporate performance,
indicating that clear division of authority and responsibility promotes efficiency in the
company. This finding also suggests that although the MCCG follows the corporate
governance code of developed countries, the recommendations are also relevant to a
developing country. Companies inMalaysia are predominantly government-owned or closely
held, but it appears that role separationmatters even in these types of companies in achieving
better performance. Prior studies on Malaysian companies using data pre-MCCG (Leng and
Abu Mansor, 2005; Rahman and Haniffa, 2005) produced inconsistent results. Hence, the
finding in the present study which analysed all non-financial listed companies post MCCG
(2012) is noteworthy in determining the effectiveness of the MCCG (2012) in enhancing
corporate performance.
The significance of board size in improving corporate performance is consistent with a
number of prior studies (Al Farooque et al., 2020; Al-Matari, 2020; Bhatt and Bhattacharya,
2015; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Mishra and Kapil, 2018; Ofoeda, 2017). In addition, contrary to
prior findings on board size in Malaysia (Ahmed Haji, 2014; Mohd Ghazali, 2010, 2014) which
did not document the significance of board size, the present study highlights its significance
in enhancing corporate performance. This finding suggests that regulatory enhancements on
corporate governance may take some time to produce the intended results as prior studies on
R squared
4%
Beta t value Significance Tolerance VIF
Constant 1.928 0.054
BODSZ 0.092 2.121 0.034** 0.693 1.444
IND 0.065 1.557 0.120 0.756 1.323
DUAL 0.090 2.448 0.015** 0.968 1.033
BMEET 0.165 4.223 0.000*** 0.853 1.172
GOVOWN 0.042 1.031 0.303 0.792 1.263
DIROWN 0.023 0.601 0.548 0.875 1.143
COSZ 0.069 1.710 0.088* 0.795 1.258









Malaysian companies employing data pre-MCCG (2012) did not find board size to influence
corporate performance. The results of the present study imply that larger board size allows
better exchange of ideas and formulation of strategic policies, thereby driving companies
toward better performance.
5. Conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future research
The aim of the paper is to determine if the continuous revisions on the corporate governance
code succeeded in enhancing corporate performance and whether the traditional traits of
ownership structure continue to influence corporate performance. The regression analysis of
all non-financial main board companies listed on BursaMalaysia shows that board meetings,
role duality and board size are significant determinants of corporate performance. In contrast,
government and director ownership are no longer influencing corporate performance.
The results imply that fewer board meetings are associated with better corporate
performance. This may be interpreted as fewer meetings signalling fewer problems in the
company and hence a better corporate performance. Separation of roles also appears to
facilitate division of accountability and responsibility leading to enhanced corporate
performance. The significance of board size suggests that the bigger the board size, the
higher the possibility of having members with diverse backgrounds, skills and experience.
These qualities when brought into boardroom discussion assisted the board in arriving at
optimal decisions.
The above findings provide new evidence of the effectiveness of the MCCG (2012) in
improving company performance. Although the MCCG (2012) does not specifically state the
recommended number of board meetings and board size, the significance of these attributes
together with role duality show the importance of internal governance in shaping company
processes and hence performance. Companies should therefore apply the principles
prescribed in the MCCG (2012) diligently to ensure optimum output and sustainable
performance. The non-significance of the ownership variables indicates they are less
important than corporate governance in determining corporate performance. It appears that
as businesses grow and with a globalized economy, traditional traits may not have a
significant role in ensuring business prosperity.
The results imply that Malaysia should continue focussing on enhancing corporate
governance in order to further promote corporate sustainability. Of the four corporate
governance variables investigated in this study, only independent directors were found to be
insignificant. Although this finding had been observed in previous studies (Ahmed Haji,
2014; Leng, 2004; Mohd Ghazali, 2010), those studies examined data pre-MCCG (2012) and did
not include all non-financial listed companies. The present study shows that concerns over
the effectiveness of independent directors (Meng, 2009; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006)
are still valid. Even after more than ten years of the issuance of the first version of the MCCG,
the impact of the presence of independent directors on corporate performance is unclear. The
relevant regulatory authority could perhaps provide guidelines to strengthen and refine the
criteria and process of appointing independent directors so that companies benefit from those
appointments.
This study investigates 742 non-financial main board–listed companies for the financial
year 2013, a year after the introduction of MCCG (2012). Hence the results may not apply to
financial companies and other years. Future research can perhaps include all types of listed
companies and execute a longitudinal study to gain a more comprehensive result and
understanding on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate
performance. Additionally, future research could also consider employing a different






1. The list was taken from Bursa Malaysia website on 18 June 2014.
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